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remain the responsibility of the author.ON THE SELECTIVE HEDGING OF BANK ASSETS
WITH TREASURY BILL FUTURES CONTRACTS
Introduction
Recent economic conditions have stimulated a search for quick and
i nexpensi ve methods to reduce the interest rate r; sk borne by banks and
other financial intermediaries. Typically, banks borrow short-term and
lend long-term funds. This balance sheet structure exposes the bank to the
risk that interest rates will ri se unpredictably, narrow; og the spread
between asset and liability interest rates. Increased interest rate
volatility creates planning problems for bank management. These factors,
along with a he;ghtened competiti ve envi ronment ; n the bank;og ; ndus'tr-y ,
work to erode interest rate spreads and create a need for new risk
management tools.
In response to these recent conditions, banks have sought a match
of interest rate-sensit i ve assets with ;nterest rate-sensi t tve
liabilities. One method of doing this is to substitute variable rate loans
for those with fi xed rates. Another alternative is to restructure the
balance sheet by either shortening the maturity of bank assets or
1engthening the maturity of bank 1iabi 1ities, Both alternati ves invol ve
either waiting until bank portfolios turn over or selling long-term loans
and investments to fund short-term loans and investments. Capital market
imperfections usually prevent a quick sale of loans without risk of loss
due to different market eval uations of loan assets. It is al so difficult
to lengthen the term to maturity of bank liabilities without a significant
increase in the cost of bank funds. All of these methods of responding to\
-2-
current market conditions represent relatively long-term solutions to the
problem.
This article focuses on a short-term solution to the problems of
match;n9 ; nterest r-at.e-senstt t vee assets and 1;abilities. Financial futures
contracts can be used to hedge the gap between rate-insensitive assets and
rate-sensitive liabilities, effectively protecting the value of assets. To
hedge the r-t sk of an ;nctease in;nterest rates. the bank sells a T-bi11
futures contract! call ing for the future del t very of securities in an
amount sufficient to lock in the value of bank assets relative to
1;abilHies.
Use of financial futures marketsal'ow banks to respond qut ckl y
to changes in the economic environment and to continue making long-term,
fixed rate loans. However, there is evidence that the precentage of banks
currently using financial futures is quite small.2 Explanations for the
lack of futures trading by banks include current bank regulations, the use
of cash market alternatives to futures trading as discussed above, or the
1ack of research on the specific practice and useful ness of futures
hedging. Since financial futures markets are relatively new, increased
bank participation in these markets may result from a greater understanding
of the optimal bank use and resulting effectiveness of financial futures.
Several authors have contributed to our present understanding of
financial futures as hedging instruments. Ederington was the first to
apply mean-variance portro'l tn theory to financial futures trading.
Subsequently, articles by Franckl e, and Cicchetti, Dale and Vignola
extended Ederingtoh's work by correcting for misspecification in the
portfol io model. For the Treasury Bill and Government National Mortgage-3-
Association Certificate futures contracts, these authors estimate that
60-70 percent of the variance of the hedged asset's return can be
eliminated for two-week hedges and 70-80 percent for four-week hedges. As
a result, financial futures could serve as an excellent mechanism for
hedging interest rate risk.
The portfolio model used in these articles ts not directly
appl icable to the typical situation faced by financial intermediaries,
however. Futhermore, optimal financial futures positions in these art1cles
are found by minimizing the variance of the hedged asset l s return without
regard to alternative risky assets, interest rate expectations. or the
investment requi red to trade futures. Much of the same criticism app1ies
to a variation on the basic portfolio model developed by Franckle and
Senchak , A study by Parker and Daigler, however, directly addresses the
effectiveness of T-bill futures in hedging the gap between rate-insensitive
assets and rate-sensitive liabilities in a bank's balance Sheet.
Unfortunately, the hedging strategy they employ is not based on a theory of
bank behavior.
To correct the shortcomings of the existing literature, this
research addresses the following questions. How should a bank trade gO-day
T-bill futures in an asset management strategy that includes T-bill
investments and illiquid, uncertain loans? To what extent can bank profits
be stabilized by trading T-bill futures and is the stabilization potential
similar across banks of various sizes? What is the effect of different
interest rate forecasts and risk bearing preferences on the optimal hedging
strategy? Lastly, to what extent are bank futures trading decisions
constrained by the regulatory requirement that futures positions represent
bona fide hedges of interest rate exposure?-4-
Beginning with a theory of optimal futures trading by a risk
averse banking firm, this paper calculates T-bill futures positions as a
function of T-bi l l investments, loans, and expectations about interest
rates. The optimal use of the hedging strategy over the period 1976 to
1981 for banks of various asset sizes in the Eleventh Federal Reserve
District ts then simulated. Depending upon bank size. risk aversion, and
interest rate expectations, different results from the hedging strategy are
calculated and summarized. The simulation results show that partial
hedging of interest rate risk is usually optimal, especially for banks with
assets between $.5 and $1 billion, and that current bank regulations on
futures trading have a limited benefit for only the smallest banks in the
sample.
A Simple Model of a Bank
To answer the questions posed above and guide a simulation of
Treasury bill futures trading by banks, a model of bank decisionmaking is
needed. Articles by Pyle and by Baltensperger suggest several possible
approaches. One approach is to assume that total bank liabilities are
exogenous and the probl em for the banking fi rm centers on optimal asset
choice, where asset returns are uncertain. Another approach is to focus on
the liability side of the balance sheet, assuming the asset side is
exogenously determined. In this situation, the banking firm can decide on
either deposit quantities with interest rates given (perhaps by Regulation
Q or market forces) or deposit rates with random deposit flows. Finelly,
the most complete approach goes beyond the partial models of asset or
liability choice to consider the interaction of asset and liability
decisions.-5-
The approach used in this paper is a complete model of the
banking firm, but with simplifications to facilitate a simulation of
Treasury bill futures trading. The model used here is closely related to
the model developed by Sealey. Similar to Sealey's model, deposit flows
than a choice variable. A
However, in the model below, and the return to bank loans are uncertain.
Treasury securities are a risky alternative
essuned illtqu td and predetermined, rather
to riskY loans. loans are
T-bill futures decision i s 1ncluded as a liability on the bank's balance
sheet with a return related to the random T-bill return. Finally, unlike
Sealey, the model assumes that bank management does not set demand and
savings deposit interest rates and they are given by Regulation (J
restrictions.
More formally, the model is given as follows. Suppose bank
management has a three-month planning horizon. At the beginning of the
planning horizon before deposit flows is revealed, management must decide
on the investment in Treasury bills, and the size of the T-bill futures
position, given a fixed level of loans. Once these decisions are made, the
size of deposit inflows or outflows is revealed. Funds are purchased or
sold for the gO-day planning period to insure that the balance sheet
balances. No other decisions are made until the beginning of the next
planning period.
Besides uncertainty associated with deposit flows, it is assumed
that the term to maturity of all bank loans and T-bill investments extend
beyond the planning horizon. This implies that at the beginning of the
decision period bank management does not know the return to holding loans
and T-bill investments over the planning period.3 For simplicity assume
all bank assets have a six-month term to maturity so that at the end of the-6-
period bank assets have 13 weeks to maturity. The uncertain return to
holding Treasury bills over the planning period is related to the
uncertainty associated with initiating a T-bill futures position three
months prior t? contract maturity, provided both interest rates converge at
maturity. The model assumes convergence of cash and futures T-bill rates
or the absence of basis risk.4 The simulation described in the next
sect;on does not. In sum, bank liabilities are more interest
rate-sensitive than assets, exposing the bank to the risk that profits will
fall if interest fates rise over the planning period.
To initiate a futures trade, margin money must be deposited with
a commodity broker. This margin is not applied against the value of the
futures contract as in a stock purchase but is held by the brokerage house
as a performance bcnd.B To exit the futures market, the trader need only
take an equal and opposite position at a later date to offset the initial
position. After performing this contract offset, all margin deposited with
the broker is returned, less a fixed coemtsston.f This margin deposit is
required to initiate either a bUy or a sell position.
Define I{X) as a binary function that depends on the type of
futures position taken. Let I(X) = +1 if X is positive (a buy position)
and let I(X) = -I if X is negative (a sell position). If h is the per
dollar margin requirement, then I(X}h(l - RX)X is the margin deposit for
a futures position of value (I - RX)X. Note that by construction I(X)h(1
- RX)X is positive regardless of whether the trader buys or sells futures
contracts.-7-
The bank's balance sheet can now be expressed as:
L + T + I(X)h(1 - RX)X = B + 0 (1)
where~ L ... predetermined loans maturing in 26 weeks, ~O,
T = a 26-week T-bill investment, a decision variable 2.0,
X = a T-bill futures position with X>O representing an asset (buy)
position and X<O representing a liability (sell) position, a
decision variable.
S ... purchase (8)0) or sale (8<0) of funds over a gO-day period, a
decision variable, and
o ... demand and savings deposits.
Bank management must choose T and X before the random level of deposits, 0,
i s realized. The variable B then adjusts to balance the bank's balance
sheet.
Currently, a joint policy statement issued by the Federal Reserve
System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. and the Comptroll er of the
Currency sets the guidelines for bank use of financial futures contracts.7
These regulations are quite general in all owi ng indi vi dua1 banks to appl y
their own futures trading strategy to specific bank conditions. Regulatory
gui del ines do recut re that fi nancial futures trading strategies be bona
fide hedges of the interest rate exposure of the overall balance Sheet,
1eavin9 the specHies of the hedgi ng program up to indi vi dua1 banks.
In the model, this governmental restriction can be captured by
limiting the position in the "l-btl I futures market to be no greater than
the absolute value of the interest rate exposure of the bank, (L + T).
This is called macro hedging and does not preclude the possibility that the
T-bill futures position is a partial hedge (less than 100 percent) of the-8-
bank IS interest rate exposure. Alternatively, a micro hedge is a futures
market position that hedges a specific asset or liability in the bank's
balance sheet rather than some measure of the gap between rate-insensitive
assets and rate-sensitive liabilities. That is, a micro hedging program in
this model restricts the futures decision to a liability position in the
T-bill futures market no greater, in absolute value, than the bank's T-bill
investment. Since a macro hedging strategy would obviously be more
effective in reducing the variability of bank wealth in this model, micro
hedging is not investigated in the simulation below.8
Bank profits are given by the revenues from loans, T-bill
investments, T-bill futures trading and the sale of funds minus the costs
of purchasing funds. Regulation Q deposits. and factor services. For
simplicity. assume the loans are made on a discount basis. Therefore. bank
profits at the end of the planning horizon are given by:
11" = [(I - Rl) - (I - Rll]l + [(I RT) - (I
- h(1 RX)]X - RBB - RDD - fl - fT









= the interest rate on loans with 90 days to maturity,
= the interest rate on loans with 180 days to maturity.
= the interest rate on T-bills with 90 days to maturity.
= the interest rate on T-bills with 180 days to maturity.
= the interest rate on a 13-week T-bill futures contract 90
days before maturity.
RB = the rate of return on purchased or sold funds for 90 days,
RO
= the rate of return payable on demand and savings deposits,
set by Regulation Q.
f L(L) = the real resource costs of servicing loan accounts, f'>O.
f'L>0' and-9-
f (T) ::: the real resource costs of making T-bill investments. f')O,
f")O.
Note in equation (2) that the return to loans, T-bill investments, and
T-bill futures trading is the price change in these discount instruments
over the planning period.9 It is also assumed that the real resource cost
of operating the bank can be measured on the uses of funds side of the
balance sheet.
The objective of the banking firm is to choose the ex ante
controls T and X and the ex post control B to maximize the expected utility
of profit, denoted U(1l"). subject to the balance sheet constraint in
equatt on (1) and the expectations about the future, Sfnee the balance
sheet constraint can be solved for the ex post control B, in terms of the
ex ante controls, T and X, the relevant maximization problem can be stated
as:
Maximize EU [(RL - RL - RB)L + (RT - RT - RB)T
T~O, a~X~-(L+T)
+ (RX - RT - h(l - RX)(l - RB))X
+ (RB - RalD - fL - fT], (3)
where E = the expectations operator, and it is assumed the regulatory
constraint a~X~-(L+T) appl tes. Bank management is assumed to be risk
averse so that U
1 (1t"» O and U"(1t")<O. Recall the random variables in this
problem are RL' Rp and D. Bank management is assumed to possess a
subjective, joint probability distribution on these random variables,
denoted F(R'L' Rp D). Furthermore it is assumed this joint distribution
does not change over the planning horizon.
The first order optimality conditions for this problem are given-10-
EU'(,,)(RT - RT - RB - fr) = 0
EU'(,,)[RX - RT - h(1 - RX)(1 - RB)) = 0
(4)
(5)
By subtracting condition (5) from condition (4), the optimal T-bill
investment decision ;s the solution of: ,
RT - RX - RB + h(1 - RX)(1 - RB) - fT = 0 (6)
Since no random elements appear in condition (6) and this condition i s
independent of the other decisions, it uniquely determines the optimal
T-bill investment. T*. Optimal T-bill investments depend only on the
T-bill spot and futures market interest rates at the beginning of the
planning period, the known interest rate on funds purchased or sold, the
per dollar margin requirement, and the marginal resource cost of making
T-bill instruments. Expectations about the future and aversion to risk
play no part in the decision.
Focusing on the optimality condition in (5), note that it can be
rewritten as:
where Cov(a,b) is the covariance between random variables a and b. When
the random variables are joint normally distributed, Rubinstein has shown
in general that equation (7) can be expressed as:
EU'(")E(Rx - RT - h(1 - RX)(1 - RB) + EU"(,,)Cov(". - RT) = 0 (8)
Further, if bank management is constant absolute risk averse then the fixed
index of risk aversion c equals _UU(1r)/U'(r).ll This implies cEU'(1r) =
-EU"(,,).
Ro)Cov(D,RT), condition (8) can be solved for the optimal T-bill
futures position, X*.x* =
-11-
_r" + RX- ERr + h(l - Rxl (I - RBI
c Var (RrJ
LCovIRL, Ri) - IRe - RoICovID, Rrl.
Var(RrJ
(g)
In the fight hand side of equation (9). it seems plausible that:
(i) the covariance between the interest rates on loans and T-bills
(Cov(RL,Rr)) i s positive, (ii) the difference between the interest
rates on purchased funds and deposits (RB - RO) ts positive, and (iii)
the covariance between T-bill interest rates and the level of deposits
(Cov(D. RT)) ts negative. The latter effect is due to disintermediation
and the presence of interest rate ceilings. If so, then expectations of
lower T-bill interest rates and an expected increase in T-bill prices,
decreases the liability position in the futures marekt. Less will be
hedged in the futures market. since the bank expects it·s interest rate
exposu re to be sma11er. In fact, the bank mi ght even desire to specu1ate
in interest rate futures (X* > 0), if interest rates are expected to fall
sufficiently far, and regulators allowed such behavior. Conversely, the
greater the expected T-bi 11 rate at the end of the period or the greater
the expected decline in T-bill prices, the greater the futures market
hedge.
Also note that the greater the sensitivity of deposit flows to
T-bill rates, the greater the futures market hedge. The more sensitive
deposit outflows are to higher T-bill interest rates, the greater the
outflow of funds at T-bill rates rise. Relatively high cost funds must be
purchased to balance the balance sheet. To protect against this squeez on
profits, the bank is pushed toward a short liability rather than long asset
futures position to lock in the known interest rate on assets. A short-12-
position is then used to protect against the higher cost of purchased funds
when disintermediation is a problem.
The Hedging Simulation
To simulate the T-bill hedging strategy suggested by the model of
the banking firm, observations for each of the elements on the right hand
side of equation (9) must be collected. The purpose here is not to perform
a complete simulation of all bank decisions in the model, but to calculate
the optional futures position assuming the Tvbtl l investment decision is
optimal. In the last section, equation (6) shows the T-bill investment
decision can be separated from the other portfolio decisions. This allows
the calculation of an optimal T-bill futures position based on existing
data for bank loans and investments.
The data
The hedgi ng si mul ati on covers the time period from June 1976 to
December 1981. Trading in T-bill futures contracts began in January 1976,
at the International Monetary Market of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
Currently, T-bill contracts mature in the following four months: March,
June, September, and December. Since the bank model above assumes a three
month planning horizon and futures contract maturity at the end of the
planning period, T-bill futures market interest rates were collected on the
first day of contract maturity and on the first day of the month 90 days
prior to maturity. This procedure avoids the duration problems with the
underlying 'l-btll investment discussed by Franckle and Ciccehetti, Dale,
and Vignola. The latter quotes are used for establishing the interest
rates at which futures trading is initiated, RX in equation (9), and the
former are used for computing actual trading returns when the position is-13-
closed out. The time period contains 23 non-overlapping opportunities for
hedging as a result.
The interest fate used to compute the variance of T-bill interest
rates in the denominator of equation (9) ;s the monthly average of 13-week
'l-btl l auction rates. To capture the effects of changing interest fate
volatility. the variance of cash 'l-btl l fates was recalculated for each new
hedging period. This procedure creates a time series measuring interest
rate volatility over the simulation period. The covariance between loan
and T-bill ;nterest rates was computed and updated ;nasimi 1ar manner
using the monthly average prime fate for short-term business loans and the
monthly average auction fate for 13-week T-bill s, The rate at which banks
were assumed to sell or purchase funds was taken to be the monthly average
rate in the secondary market for three month certificates of deposit. The
covariance between the 13-week T-bill rate and deposits was calculated in a
manner similar to the method in the last paragraph. The cost of deposits,
RO, was taken to be the average interest rate on savings and demand
deposits established by Regulation Q, weighted by the size of each deposit
category. Margin requirements were set at .25 percent of position face
value, approximately the exchange minimum.
The dollar value of T-bill investments, loans, and deposits over
the period for banks in the Eleventh Federal Reserve District was taken
from the Report of Condition data gathered by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas. All member banks in the District were sorted into three asset size
categories: (i) more than $1 billion, (ii) $500 million to $1 billion, and
(;;1) $100 m'l Tl t on to $500 mi 11; on. The category 1; mits were determined-14-
arbitrarily and not set to equal ize the numbers of banks in each subset.
Banks with assets less than $100 million were omitted from this
investigation since there is some evidence that they neither use or benefit
from futures trading to the same extent as 1arger banks.11.1 The number of
banks in each subset varied over the simulation due to both asset growth
and changes in reporting procedures.
Bank averages for these variabl es were then computed at each of
the 23 simulation points to capture representative aspects of firms in each
subset. From the Report of Condition, average T-bill investments were
measured by total average Treasury securities maturing in one year or less,
loans by total average gross loans, Regulation Q deposits by the sum of
total average demand and savings deposits.
Risk aversion and expectations
Two elements of equation (9) remain to be specified. The first
is the index of constant absolute risk averston, c. This parameter
influences the size and type (asset or liability) of futures position
calculated at each decision point. For the entire simulation period and
for each category of bank size, the index of constant absol ute risk
aversion was arbitrarily assumed to range between lxlO-5 and 1x10-B.
Parameter values of IxlO-6 and lx10-8 are reported below to indicate the
change in the hedging strategies when risk aversion changes.
The last variable to be specified is ERTt the three month
forecast of the 13-week T-bill rate. Four alternative forecasts are
studied. Initially it was assumed that bank decision-makers make no
interest rate forecast other than the interest rate expected by the T-bill-15-
futures market. That is, at the initiation of the trading program, the
interest rate in the current T-bill futures quote i s taken to be the
current expected rate. Banks without economic research or forecasting
units may be able to use the T-bill futures market as an expectations
generating mechanism; therefore, T-bill futures interest rates merit
consideration as forecasts in a futures hedging strategy.
The second type of forecast used was the forward rate imbedded in
the short-term segment of the yield curve."!'y The forward rate is the
interest rate on an investment over a given period beginning at some time
in the future. $; nee the purpose here ;s to forecast one per;od T-bi11





f RT 1 = one plus the forward interest rate on a one period T-bill ,
investment beginning one period in the future~
Rr,2
= one plus the current interest rate on a two period T-bill
investment, and
RT~l = one plus the current interest rate on a one period T-bill
investment.
From the pure expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates,
the implied forward rate in the yield curve is an unbiased expectation of
the actual future interest rate when markets are in equilibrium. Since the
hedging simulation assumes the bank has a three-month planning horizon, a
forecast of the three-month T-bill rate three months in the futures can be-16-
found by squaring the current six-month T-bill rate and dividing by the
current three-month T-bill rate.
The third type of forecast used in the hedging simulation was an
ex post prediction from a single equation regression model. The model ts
estimated to explain movements in the three-month T-bill interest rate,
Rr,t as a function of real aggregate disposable income, YDt. and a three
month moving average of changes in the current Ml money supply, MAMt o
Monthly data used in estmation started in March of 1970 and ended in
December of 1981. Starting in June 1976 the model was reestimated every
quarter with new data to keep the unconditional forecasts as accurate as
pass;b1e. A slope dummy variab1e was also incorporated to account for the
effects of the October 6~ 1979~ policy change by the Federal Reserve
System•.!il On this date, the Fed announced a switch in policy, from
targeting market interest rates to targeting the supply of money.
For the entire data period, March 1970 to December 1981, the
model was estimated as (standard errors in parentheses):
RT,t : .945
(.692)





.615(Dt )(M AM t )
(.186)
SER : .796 DW : 2.033
(11 )
where, SER = the standard error of the regression, and
ow = the Durbin-Watson test statistic for first order serial
correlation.
All variables are significant at the 1% level except the intercept term.
As expected, decreases in the three month moving average of the money
supply and increases in real disposable income increase T-bill retes, but
only for the period prior to October 1979.-17-
The fourth type of forecast used was the actual T-bi 11 interest
rate existing at the end of the planning period. This forecast assumes
that bank management can predict T-bill interest rates perfectly. The
hedq l ng si mu 1ation results us; ng a perfect ;nterest rate forecast will
serve as a performance standard for evaluating the other three alternative
forecasts. Furthermore, usinq a perfect forecast in the simulation serves
as a proxy for all other possible regression and time series models capable
of predicting three-month T-bill interest rates.
Simulation Results
Table 1 shows the simulation results for the macro hedging
strategy when the risk aversion index equals lxlO-6• Sample means and
standard deviations are calculated over the 23 futures positions taken from
June 1976 to December 1981 depending upon bank size and type of T-bill
forecast used. The hedging ratio in column two is defined as X/(T+L) and
indicates the percent of 1nterest risk exposure hedged in the T-bill
futures market. In the third column, hedging effectiveness is calculated
as:





where, Var(llu) = the variance of bank profits without futures hedging.l2/
Hedging effectiveness is therefore the percent reduction in the variance of
unhedged profits due to T-bi 11 futures hedging. It takes a value of zero
if no futures trading occurs (X* = 0). Negati ve hedgi ng effectiveness-18-
Table 1. Hedging Simulation Results for t • 1.10-6• O>X>-l - T
Bank Assets
(in millions) and Hedging Hedging Futures Return Initial Margin
T-bill Forecasts Ratio Effectiveness (in mill ions) (in mill ions)
I. More than $1000
a. Futures Forecast .998a .808 3.652 3.756
(.00l) (.054) (36.655) (.536 )
b. Forward Forecast -.998 .808 3.566 3.757
(.00l) (.054) (36.494) (•534 )
c. Regression Forecast -1.000 .808 3.666 3.765
(.000) (.054) (36.659) (.53l)
d. Perfect Forecast -.999 .808 3.664 3.759
(.005) (.054) (36.659) (•537)
2. $500 to $1000
a. Futures Forecast -.849* .746 .136 .790
(.155) (.104) (6.359) (.144)
b. Forward Forecast -.879* .719 .528 .797
(.153) (.141) (5.922) (.142)
c. Regression Forecast -.965* .687 .678 .876
(.083) (.189) (6.973) (.084)
d. Perfect Forecast -.873* .729 .915 .791
(.135) (.115) (5.76l) (.124)
3. $100 to $500
a. Futures Forecast -.977* .826 .241 .287
(.040) (.059) (2.401) (.015)
b. Forward Forecast -.903* .788 .391 .266
(.176) (.096) (1.806) (.054)
c. Regression Forecast -.996 .822 .325 .293
(.014) (.058) (2.481) (.013 )
d. Perfect Forecast -.910* .768 .743 .268
(.212) (.163) (I.725) (.064)
aSample mean with sample standard deviation in pa r-ent.heses ,
*Significantly less than -1 at the 5% level.-19-
indicates financial futures hedging increases the variabil ity of bank
profits relative to non-hedging. By equation (12) negative hedging
effectiveness i s most likely to occur when t~e bank speculates long in the
T-bill futures market (X*>O) and deposit flows are negatively correlated
wi t h T-bi11 ;nterest rates• Colurnn four computes the gross, annual;zed
T-bi'l futures market return to each of the strategies excluding the
repayment of initial margin at the end of the decision period.
Table 1 suggests the following relationships. Look; n9 at the
column of hedging ratios. note that for banks with assets less than $1
bill ion virtually all ratios are significantly different from -1 at the 5
percent level. This implies that these banks seek a partial hedge of their
interest rate exposure, preferring to bear part of the interest rate risk
themse1ves , Thi s risk is borne because thei r mi x of loan and T-bt11
investments is more heavily weighted toward T-bills relative to the largest
banks and their flows are less sensitive to T-bill interest rates•..!.§/ The
extent to which this causes different partial hedges across bank sizes also
depends on the total interest rate exposure facing the bank relative to the
risk aversion index assumed to apply to all sized banks. These factors
have the greatest influence on banks with assets between $.5 and $1 billion
since their hedging ratios and hedging effectiveness are lower than either
larger or smaller sized banks •..!.LI
Turning to the results within each bank size category~ note that
using a futures market forecast tn the hedging strategy yields the greatest
hedging effectiveness relative to the other forecasts. Hedging with either
forward or regression forecasts yields more selective position-taking which-20-
t s usually more costly to initiate and reduces the variance of profits
less. It also appears that using either of these forecasts results in
greater, al though ins;qnt ficant. futures returns especially for the two
smallest bank size categories. It is not surprising that the greatest
futures returns for all bank sizes result when using perfect forecasts.
Finally. note that for the largest banks the hedging ratio and
hedging effectiveness measures are virtual1y independent of the type of
forecast used, while for smaller banks the results are more sensitive to
the quality of the forecast. The explanation for this lies in the
assumption of equal risk aversion across ell bank sizes. For the largest
banks, interest rate exposure T*+l* is too large to be affected by
different forecasts given a risk aversion index of i-re-e. This does not
imply that the hedging results waul d be independent of the type of forecast
used for smaller values of the risk aversion index. The less the banks
aversion to interest rate risk, the more important the qual tty of the
forecast becomes. Conversely, the interest rate exposure of the smaller
banks is small enough relative to the constant absolute risk aversion
parameter to yield widely varying results depending on the forecast used.
Conceptionally, model ing differential aversion to risk, such that small
banks are more risk averse and large banks are less risk averse, would help
equal ize hedging effectiveness across bank sizes given an interest rate
forecast. Overall, the hedging effectiveness results are similar to the
fi ndi ngs of Ederington and Franckle, whil e opt i mal hedgi ng ratias reported
here are much higher.
To illustrate the sensitivity of the hedging simulation results
to the specification of the risk aversion parameters, Tabl e 2 shows the-21-
Bank Assets
(in millions) and Hedgi n9 Hedging Futures Return Initial Margin
T-bil1 Forecasts Ratio Effectiveness (in millions) (in mill ions)
1. More than $1000
a. Futures Forecast -1.000a .808 3.666 3.765
(•000) (•054) (36.659) (.537)
b. Forward Forecast -.738* .608 8.068** 2.768
(.381) (.289) (17.799) (1.451 )
c. Regression Forecast -.956 .773 4.539 3.625
(.162) (.142) (36.279) (.84l)
d. Perfect Forecast -.770* .626 13.745** 2.888
(.368) (.295) (19.959) (1.472)
2. $500 to $1000
a. Futures Forecast -1.000 .654 .889 .908
(.000) (.232) (7.882) (.047)
b. Forward Forecast -.667* .430 1.882** .601
(.434) (.310) (3.625) (•393)
c. Regression Forecast -.930 .608 1.769 .842
(.198) (.243) (6.266) (.183)
d. Perfect Forecast -.739* .439 3.141** .667
(.403) (.310) (4.337) (.365)
3. $100 to $500
a. Futures Forecast -1.000 .823 .314 .294
(.000) (.057) (2.499) (.011)
b. Forward Forecast -.652* .524 .598** .194
(.449) (.364) (1.179) (.134)
c. Regression Forecast -.913 .749 .706 .269
(.249) (.212) (1.888) (.075)
d. Perfect Forecast -.739* .604 1.017** .218
(.403) (.333) (1.411) (.120)
a Sample mean with sample standard deviation in parentheses.
* Significantly different than -1 at the 5% level.
**Significantly different than zero at the 5% level.-22-
hedging results for banks less risk averse than in Table 1. The risk
aversion index, c, is here assumed to be lxlO-8•
In this situation. a 100% hedge of interest rate exposure is
optimal for all sized banks when the T-bill forecast is taken from either
the T-bill futures market or the regression model. Although these
strategies do not generate significant profits. the reduction f n the
variability of bank profits ts greater than any of the other strategies.
This conclusion about hedging effectiveness ts similar to the results in
Table 1, indicating its generality across different aversions to risk. It
is also interesting that banks less averse to interest rate risk should
optimally hedge more of their exposure rather than less. Yet this is the
case for the two smallest size categories of banks, upon a comparison of
Tables 1 and 2, lines 2a and ae, The explanation for this lies in the
regulatory constraint, O>X>-L-T. Banks desire to speculate on the short
side of the market by selling Tc-b'i l l contracts with greater value than
thei r interest rate exposure, but the regulatory constraint prohibits them
from doing so. Hence, a 100% hedge ;s the best that can be done.
As banks became less risk averse, one would expect that optimal
hedging becomes more selective, except when using a T-bill futures market
forecast as argued in the last paragraph. Therefore, the effectiveness of
a hedging strategy at lower risk aversion levels should also be less.
Indeed, these expectations are borne out, sinee the percent reduction in
the variability of bank profits is smaller in Table 2 for all size
categories and forecasts than in Table 1. This is true even for hedging
with either a T-bill futures market or the regression forecast, indicating
that a 100% hedge of interest rate exposure does not necessarily lead to-23-
the greatest hedging effectiveness especially for banks in the two smallest
size categories studied. The tendency for banks with assets between $.5
and $1 billion to experience lower hedging effectiveness than either larger
or smaller banks is preserved when banks are less risk averse. As for the
significance of futures returns, significant positive returns are generated
from the hedging simulation at low levels of risk aversion using either a
T-bi11 forecast from the forward market or a perfect forecast. Al so note
that with either of these forecasts, the optimal hedging ratios are partial
hedges.
To assess the impact of current regulations regarding futures
trading by banks, the hedging simulation was al so conducted without
constraining the T-bill futures position to be a bona fide hedge of
interest rate exposure. That is, the optimal futures position was
calculated with requring 02,.X>-L-T. The question is, what is the effect of
regulating bank participation in interest rate futures markets and is this
burden shared equally by all sized banks? Table 3 contains the simulation
results when the T-bil1 futures position can assume any value on the real
time and the risk aversion index is lxlO-6•
Upon comparing Table 3 with Table 1, note that in the absence of
the regulatory constraint banks with assets of more than $1 billion and
with assets between $100 and $500 mi 11 t on woul d opti me11 y hedge more than
100% of their interest rate exposure. For the largest sized banks this
involves average short speculation of 12% of their interest rate exposure,
over the four alternative forecasts. For the smallest sized banks, short
speculation averages 33% of their exposure over the four forecasts. The
intermediate sized banks optimally hedge either less than, greater than, or-24-
Table 3. Hedging Simulation Results for c • lxlO-6, - <X<+
Bank Assets
(in mill ions) and Hedginq Hedging Futures Return Initial Margin
T-bill Forecasts Ratio Effectiveness (fn millions) (in mill ions)
1. More than $1000
a. Futures Forecast -1.101a * .817 3.117 4.136
(.064) (.056) (40.443) (.612)
b. Forward Forecast -1.120* .815 3.615 4.207
(.065) (.057) (39.964) (.600)
c. Regression Forecast -1.162* .812 3.877 4.361
(.058) (.059) (41.236) (.598)
d. Perfect Forecast -1.102* .816 3.992 4.144
(.056) (.056) (39.821) (.611)
2. $500 to $1000
a. Futures Forecast -.911 .749 .065 .826
(.217) (.106) (6.408) (.197)
b. Forward Forecast -.991 .706 .563 .897
(.256) (.146) (6.001) (.227)
c. Regression Forecast -1.162* .624 .824 1.051
(.231) (.241) (7.228) (.198)
d. Perfect Forecast -.920* .730 .940 .834
(.184) (.117) (5.772) (.166)
3. $100 to $500
a. Futures Forecast -1.082* .827 .204 .317
(.131) (.059) (2.459) (.032)
b. Forward Forecast -1.317* .538 .702 .388
(.512) (.344) (2.194) (.154)
c. Regression Forecast -1.842* .033** .934 .543
(.507) (.796) (3.384) (.156)
d. Perfect Forecast -1.105 .698 1.080*** .325
(.320) (.194) (2.256) (.096)
a Same mean with sample st4ndard deviation in parentheses.
* Significantly different than -1 at the 5% level.
** Not significantly different than zero at the 5% level.
***Significantly different than zero at the 5% level.-25-
equal to 100% of this exposure depending on the forecast. All hedging
ratios are higher on average without the regulatory constraint than with
it.
Probably more indicative of the impact of bank regulations. are
the hedging effectiveness measures. If, by requiring futures positions to
be bona fide hedges, bank regulations reduce the effectiveness of a hedging
strategy then risk shifting opportunities are lost in the futures market
and must be sought el sewhere. This pr-oblem does not appear in the results
in Table 3. In fact the mean differences between hedging effectiveness in
Tables 1 and 2 is statistically insignificant for all hedging strategies
for the two largest size categories of banks. For the smallest banks,
hedging strategies that use either the forward market forecast or the
regression forecast result in significantly different measures of hedging
effectiveness.18/ Using these forecasts hedging effectiveness is greater
when the regulatory constraint is in effect than without it. By
prohibiting speculative activity on the long and short sides of the T-bi1l
futures market, the regulations on futures trading make little difference
to the average reduction in the variance of bank profits obtainable through
hedging. The cost of these regulations is an insignificant reduction in
the average futures return, as well as a reduction in initial margin
investment.
Conclusions
The practical appl tcabi l ity of these results depends on the
assumptions of the underlying model, as well as several assumptions
specific to the simulation itself. Bank assets certainly include loans and;
-26-
government securities other than 26-week loans and T-bills. To assume so
creates an opportunity for futures trading in T-notes, T-bonds, and GNMAs,
along with T·bills. These alternative investments were not modeled into
the bank's decision problem, however, for simpl icity. Considering such a
diverse asset structure would lead to an integrated micro hedging strategy
with possibly differing results. Also, to the extent that bank loans may
have terms to maturity of less than three months, carry variable interest
rates or are liquid, then using the sum of T-bill investments and loans as
a measure of ;nterest rate exposure overstates the true gap requt r; n9
management. As a resul t , hedgi n9 rat;as and hedgi 09 effecti veness in the
simulation would be biased upward. Finally, this investigation could have
focused at futures hedgi ng to lock in interest rates on the 1i abi 1ity si de
of the balance sheet, instead of hedging to insure against a loss of asset
value.
As for the simulation itself, one objectionable assumption
concerns equal risk aversion indices across all three size categories of
banks. It is likely that smaller banks are more risk averse than larger
ones, but it is a question best answered by empirical analysis. The degree
of risk aversion does influence the results and there is no a priori
justification for the parameter val ues assumed above. Assumi ng equal r-t sk
aversion across bank sizes when it ;s not true tends to understate the
results for small er banks or overstate the results for 1arger banks. It
also remains to be seen whether the characteristics of banks in the
Eleventh Federal Reserve District are representative of banks across the
entire U.S. Since the southwest has experienced relatively greater
economic growth than other regions of the U.S., one would also expect its-27-
banking institutions to be different in asset composition and in the
sensitivity of deposit flows to T-bil' ~ates. If so, the hedging
simulation results are not generally applicable.
In cone1usi on. the bank hedgiog strategy developed above ;5 a
mac r-o hedgi n9 strategy that considers the interest rate r-t sks associated
with illiquid loans, T-bills, and random deposit flows. The modeled bank
faces the risk that interest rates will rise, decreasing the value of its
assets and forcing it to seek relatively costly sources of funds. Selling
contracts in the T-bill futures market is a tool for the short term
management of all these risks. In this sense, the model of bank decision-
making extends the prevalent literature on the theory of hedging with
interest rate futures. The solution of the model for the optimal futures
position under constant absolute risk aversion reveals the importance of
interest rate expectations and risk aversion in the hedging strategy. Both
these parameters help determine the type of position taken and its size.
The simulation of the hedging strategy for stylized banks of
different sizes with different mechanisms for generating expectations.
different aversions to risk. and different regulatory constraints
illustrates the generality applicability of the futures trading decision
rules. Overall, optimal hedging with the T-bills futures contract does not
imply a 100% hedge of a bank t s interest rate exposure in virtually all
simulations. This result is heavily dependent on bank size. T-bill rate
expectations and the bank IS degree of risk aversion, however. It does not
appear that Eleventh District banks with assets between $.5 and $1 billion
can reduce the variability of profits through hedging to the extent that-28-
either larger or smaller banks can. The reason for this is that (i) their
assets contain a greater percentage of T-bil1s over loans and (ii) their
Regulation Q deposits are relatively less sensitive to T-bill interest
rates.
The pol icy tmplications of the simulation are that current bank
regulations which limit bank participation in interest rate futures markets
prevent the stylized banks from speculating on the short side of the
market. However, the loss in expected utility associated with the
regulatory constraint is not realized in significantly reduced hedging
effect;veness but in ; nstgn;ficantly small er futures tr-edt 09 returns and
smaller initial margins. Since hedging effectiveness is the same with as
without the regulatory constraint when banks use the T-bill hedging
strategy. the current usefulness of these regulations might be questioned.
If banks behave as modeled here. they do not willingly speculate in
interest rate futures without reference to the maximization of the expected
utility of profits. which includes both expectations and risk-bearing
preferences. Only for the smallest category of banks could a limited case
be made for the benefits of current futures trading regulations. For these
banks and for two of the four forecasting methods. the presence of the
regulatory constraint significantly increases hedging effectiveness. Yet
on average. none of the above uses of the hedging strategy result in an
increase in the variability of bank profits. even assuming the lack of
regulation. As banks become more aware of the benefits of financial
futures, it seems likely that current bank regulations on futures trading
will be found to be inconsistent with the desire for a more competitive
banking industry.-29-
FOOTNOTES
1. The T-bill futures contract traded at the International Monetary Market
of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange calls for delivery of T-bills with
90 days to maturity. Contract size ts $1 million in 'l-btll face
value. Interest rates on the T-bill futures contract are quoted on a
discount basis.
2.. Drabenstott and '~cOonley report that of 330 agricultural banks
responding to a nationwide financial futures survey, 7 percent were
using futures to hedge interest rate risk as of January 1982. Koch,
Steinhauser, and Whigham report that of 230 financial institutions
responding to a survey in the Sixth Federal Reserve District, 10
percent were using financial futures as of May 1982.
3. This model abstracts from the problems caused by default risk on bank
loans. All loans are assumed default risk free.
4. Usi ng regression techniques, one can not reject the hypothesis that
13-week T-bill spot interest rates and T-bill futures market interest
rates on the first day of contract maturity are equal from June 1976 to
December 1981.
5. Any excess margin monies beyond maintenance margin is usually invested
in a money market mutual fund by the brokerage house. T-bill
securities are al so accepted as initial margin in many cases. These
aspects of futures trading are not modeled here and hence the estimated
costs of futures trading in the simulation tend to be biased upward.-30-
6. Fixed commissions are ignored. Currently (10/1/82) these commissions
amount to be approximately 100 dollars per contract per roundturn
transaction.
7. For regulations relating to national banks see Banking Circular No. 79,
issued by the Comptroller of the Currency, revised March 1980. For
excellent discussions of these regulations, see the articles by
Drabenstott and McDonley and by Koch, Steinhauser, and Whigham.
8. Although not reported in the simulation results below, the author has
estimated that futures positions be micro hedges. These results are
available upon request.
9. Bank loans are not usually made on a discount basis, as is assumed tn
equation (2). This assumption i s made for simplicity and since loan
decisions are not the focus of analysis, no loss of generality results.
10. A sufficient condition for a maximum requires that the utility function
demonstrate risk aversion.
11. The only known function exhibiting the CARA property is the negative
exponential, -exp [-en], where c is the index of constant absolute risk
aversion and rr is the bank IS profit.
12. See Drabenstott and McDonley and see Koch, Steinhauser, and Whigham.
Simulation results for banks with less than $100 million in deposits
are available upon request to the author.
13. For further discussion on a comparison between forward and futures
interest rates as expectations see Lang and Rasche, and Poole.-31-
14. A Chow test was performed to test the hYpothesis of a structural change
in the model in October 1979. The null hypothesis of equal regression
coefficients before and after the Fed policy change was tested using an
F-test with 5 and 34 degrees of freedom. The computed F was 3.43 which
exceeds the critical value of the F distribution at the 5% significance
1evel ,
15. The variance of unhedged profits is gi.ven by:
Var(nn) ; L2 Var(RL) + T2 Var(RT) + (RB - RD)2var (0)
+ 2LTCov(RL,RT) - 2L(RB - RD)Cov(RL'O)
- 2T (RB - RD) COy (RT,0) •
16. The distinguishing characteristics between the different size
categories of banks are as follows (means over the simulation period
with standard deviations ;n parentheses).
Bank Asset Size in millions







( .027) (.044) ( .033)
-1,499,000 -1,018,000 -237,000
(472,000) (354,000) (75,000)
* The percent of stylized bank assets held as T-bills
** The percent of Regulation Qdeposits that are savings deposits.
***The covariance between deposits and T-bill interest rates.
As can be seen, T-bills are more important and deposits are more
expensive for the two smallest size categories of banks than for the
largest. While the COV(O.RT) is also smaller for these banks, the
relative cost of this source of funds is also higher. Hence, profits
are less sensitive to Regulation Q deposit flows.-32-
17. See footnote 16, above.
18. Statistical significance henceforth implies the 5% level.-33-
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